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Newport, RI

FORCE PROTECTION: A CRITICAL FUNCTION DURING MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

by

James F. Lindner

Special Agent, NCIS

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: James D Lindner

16 June 1995

Paper directed by Captain D. Watson
Chairman, Joint Military Operations Department

Douglas C Hime 15 May 95

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

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ABSTRACT

The unique nature of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) makes the identification and achievement of strategic and operational objectives difficult. This often focuses emphasis on the cost of an operation. Consequently, losses in personnel and equipment can disproportionately affect strategic and operational decisions. Force protection, therefore, becomes a critical function during MOOTW--a function that will enable a commander to retain freedom of action. Although progress on force protection doctrine has been made, it continues to focus on traditional security measures implemented at the tactical level. This paper reviews existing force protection doctrine and recent force protection efforts in Somalia. Recommendations regarding joint force protection doctrine are made. The recommended doctrine would include the unique threat to U.S. forces posed by MOOTW and it would direct that traditional and non-traditional security measures be applied as a part of a synergistic program, planned and directed at the operational level. In addition, recommendations for the improvement of organizational structure and intelligence support to force protection are also made.

> Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced....
>
> Clauswitz, On War

INTRODUCTION

On the morning of 23 October 1983 a suicide bomber drove his vehicle of death into the Marine Barracks at the Beirut International Airport. The subsequent explosion killed 241 United States personnel. In a moment, the cost of this operation reached a point that exceeded the value of its objective--if that objective was ever really clear. Shocked by this loss of life, the national command authorities withdrew the Marines from Beirut. In today's terminology, the United States incursion into Beirut would be designated a Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW). As the United States learned that October morning in 1983, regardless of the level or unconventional nature of the threat, MOOTW can possess all the attendant lethality of war. Following the bombing incident at Beirut Airport, the Long Commission conducted a review of the incident and the operation itself. The Commission identified two operational shortcomings: 1) commanders lacked accurate and timely intelligence, and 2) security was not commensurate with the level of the threat.

In an effort to prevent similar occurrences, the Commission recommended that the Secretary of Defense take the following corrective action: 1) improve the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence, particularly human intelligence, by the

developing all source intelligence fusion centers; and 2) enhance the defensive capabilities of forces against unconventional attacks through the development of doctrine, planning, organization, force structure, education and training.[1] The lesson from Beirut was clear--protection of friendly forces from unconventional attack should be incorporated into the planning of future military operations.[2]

As Beirut and subsequent MOOTW would demonstrate, these operations possess a unique nature that often makes the identification and achievement of clear-cut objectives difficult. Without an adequate objective against which to measure operational effectiveness, the measure often becomes the cost of the operation. As casualties become the measure by which success or failure is determined, operational and strategic decisions can be directly affected.

It is this operating environment that makes force protection a critical function during MOOTW. The essence of force protection was conceived in the recommendations of the Long Commission Report. Since then, it has evolved slowly and has only recently been addressed in joint doctrine. Unfortunately, it remains a mixture of individual security measures (i.e., anti-terrorism), executed at the tactical level. Drawing upon the spirit of the Long Commission Report, joint force protection doctrine should be further developed so it focuses on the operational level. This doctrine could then better serve unified and joint force commanders (JFC) in planning force protection support and

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[1]See Brian Michael Jenkins, The Lessons of Beirut: Testimony Before the Long Commission (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1984), 13.

[2]Ibid., 11.

organizing the assets required to render this support. This would ensure a greater unity of effort in force protection, resulting in an improvement in the overall security posture of the forces.

A first step in developing joint force protection doctrine is a definition for force protection that is common to all components. The Joint Chiefs have defined force protection as follows:

> Security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combatting terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence counterintelligence, and other security programs.[3]

The scope of this definition includes peace and war, and it will be addressed later when the adequacy of existing doctrine is discussed.

To understand the role of force protection during MOOTW, an understanding of the unique nature of MOOTW is required. MOOTW includes a large portion of the range of military operations. Moreover, two thirds of the operations that are designated as MOOTW are so-called "noncombatant operations." Appendix A depicts the range of military operations in which United States forces can be expected to become involved. The designations MOOTW and "noncombatant operations" should not be misconstrued as

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[3]Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of Military and Related Terms, Joint Pub. 1-02 ([Washington, D.C.] Joint Chiefs of Staff), 151-52.

meaning an absence of any threat to United States forces. They merely suggest that the objective of the operation can be achieved primarily through means other than combat.[4]

Set characteristics for MOOTW are difficult to identify, given the wide range of operations possible. They can, however, be considered extremely similar to the characteristics of Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC). MOOTW, which include LICs, pose "threats that are usually subtle, indirect, and long term."[5] Moreover, they possess two characteristics that make them significantly different from war. First, these operations place an emphasis on the human element. Second, the level of violence attendant in these operations is often in inverse proportion to the achievement of strategic objectives.[6] These two characteristics indicate a role of increased importance for force protection.

The current National Security Strategy has specifically identified peace keeping, peace enforcement, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, noncombatant evacuation operations, and humanitarian relief as being typical of the operations in which the United States can expect to be involved.[7] Moreover, two of the three components of the National Military Strategy, peacetime engagement and conflict prevention, involve

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[4]Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0 ([Washington, D.C.] Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993), II-1.

[5]Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict, Joint Pub. 3-07 ([Washington, D.C.] Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993), I-3.

[6]John S. Fulton, "The Debate about Low Intensity Conflict", Military Review LXVI (February 1986): 64.

[7]U.S. President, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1994), 8-9.

predominantly MOOTW.[8] In view of the potential for increased involvement in these operations and their unique nature, commanders should be better prepared to include force protection in their operational planning.

Throughout history, military theorists and strategists have used certain principles to serve as a guide for warfighting. Security is usually included among these principles, but is often rated among the least important (See Appendix B).[9]

Recognizing the unique nature of MOOTW, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have modified the principles of war to better fit the characteristics of these operations. The revised principles are objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, legitimacy, and perseverance.[10] Gone are offense, mass, and maneuver, which tended to dominate the prioritization schemes of most theorists. Security, however, remains as one of only two principles retained from the original nine. Moreover, the JCS have specifically equated security with force protection.[11] If security is to be one of the principles by which MOOTW are to be conducted, the JCS must also provide commanders with the doctrine to do this. In the next chapter an evaluation of current force protection doctrine and its employment in Somalia is evaluated.

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[8]See Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995).

[9]See Barton Whaley, Strategem and Deception: Deception and Surprise in War (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1969), 123-25.

[10]Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993), V-2 - V-4.

[11]Ibid., V-3.

> The practice of using regular and irregular forces against an enemy's soft and relatively vulnerable rear area has been demonstrated repeatedly and successfully throughout the history of warfare.
>
> Joint Pub 3-10, Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations

CHAPTER 2

FORCE PROTECTION TODAY

Since the Long Commission, progress has been made on its recommendations. Moreover, Goldwater-Nichols has further contributed to a more unified effort in the area of force protection. At the same time, however, the scope of the threat has also expanded. The type and number of operations from the lower end of the spectrum of conflict have expanded at such a rate that the threats attendant with such operations have also expanded. Whereas the United States has primarily focused force protection on combatting terrorism, recent MOOTW have exposed personnel to threats from organized crime, civil unrest, and the random violence of armed citizens. As a result, force protection and the intelligence and counterintelligence functions that support it have lagged behind the increase in operations that require such programs.

At present, force protection does not exist as a separate doctrine. Joint Publication 3-10, Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations, presents a variety of security measures to be employed by JFCs to protect installations and forces. Only recently developed, it does

not specifically discuss MOOTW, focusing rather on the higher end of the spectrum of conflict. It describes a rear area in relation to the combat zone. It could, however, be applied to MOOTW, since its definition of rear area as, "a specific land area within a JFCs area of operation designated by the JFC to facilitate protection and operation of installations and forces supporting the joint forces,"[12] is applicable to MOOTW, despite the absence of a combat zone.

Security being its primary focus, Joint Pub 3-10 could serve as the foundation for a future force protection doctrine. It contains three concepts that are critical to planning and directing force protection at the operational level. First, it categorizes threats according to the level of violence. Threat level one includes those threats usually associated with the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, such as demonstrations, civil unrest, sabotage, and terrorism. By differentiating among the different levels of threat, JFCs can apportion resources appropriately. More importantly, rules of engagement can be established in accordance with the anticipated threat environment. This is especially critical to MOOTW.

Second, the doctrine also integrates elements of operational protection and operational fires (non-lethal) in a synergistic force protection effort more directed toward the operational level. This too is critical during MOOTW. "Security derives from more than physical protective measures. A force's security is significantly enhanced by its

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[12]Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-10, Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations, Joint Pub 3-10 ([Washington, D.C.]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993), I-2.

perceived legitimacy and impartiality."[13] It is the effective employment of psychological operations, civil affairs, and public affairs at the operational level that assists in creating a benign environment within the area of operations.

Third, it vests in a single element coordination authority for all security operations within an operating area, thereby enhancing unity of effort. This individual, designated as the Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC), can be either a component commander who wears two hats or a separate individual. Appendix C provides suggested organizational relationships between the JFC and the JRAC.

United States operations in Somalia offer excellent examples of how these critical concepts of force protection were, or were not, applied. During the United Nations Unified Task Force (UNITAF) operation, rules of engagement were commensurate with the level of threat confronting the United Nations forces. "The combination of sufficient, disciplined force, adhering to announced objectives, bore good results."[14] Conversely, during United Nations Operation Somalia (UNOSOM) II, the exact opposite was the case. The expansion of the rules of engagement increased collateral damage within the civilian community and inflicted heavy civilian casualties. Such actions eroded the support of the Somali people, making UNOSOM II an operation whose objectives were not worth the potential cost.[15]

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[13]Department of the Army, Headquarters Department of the Army, Peace Operations, FM 100-23 ([Washington, D.C.]: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1994), I-11.

[14]Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, White Paper: An Analysis of the Application of the Principles of Military Operations Other Than War (Langley Air Force Base, VA: Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, 1994), 4.

[15]Ibid., 8.

Effective use of psychological operations during UNITAF fostered mutual respect and good will between the United Nations forces and the people of Somalia. This minimized violence directed against United Nations personnel.[16]

On the negative side, unity of effort in force protection operations, during UNOSOM II, was poor. The lack of unity can be attributed to the existence of three separate operational commands within a single operational area. This lack of unity in command resulted in a failure to coordinate force protection efforts, which, ultimately, degraded the security posture of the entire force.[17]

In addition to joint doctrine, a second, and equally important pillar of force protection is intelligence and CI support. Ultimately, it is these support functions that provide the indications and warning (I & W) upon which force protection programs are built. The establishment of regional Joint Intelligence Centers (JIC), with links to national intelligence assets, has provided CINCs with the necessary internal capability to collate, analyze, produce, and disseminate intelligence. Despite these JICs, intelligence and CI support to force protection has been lacking.

During Grenada and Panama, failures were identified, often stemming from "service stove pipes and resulting inconsistent support, lack of interoperable equipment and procedures and evidence that dissemination was the single biggest shortcoming."[18]

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[16]Ibid., 4.

[17]Ibid., 7-8.

[18]Thomas R. Wilson, "Joint Intelligence and Uphold Democracy," Joint Forces Quarterly (Spring, 1995): 56.

During UNOSOM II, deficiencies in the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence also existed.[19]

In addition, the human element that characterizes MOOTW makes human intelligence (HUMINT) and CI support critical to the success of force protection operations. These particular intelligence disciplines often rely on the development of local intelligence infrastructures. They, therefore, require significant surge periods if they are to be effective. Unfortunately, the nature of MOOTW often does not permit a warning of any significance.

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[19]Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, White Paper: An Analysis of the Application of the Principles of Military Operations Other Than War, 8.

Never permit hostile factions to gain an unexpected advantage.
FM 100-23, Peace Operations

CHAPTER 3

DEVELOPING FORCE PROTECTION DOCTRINE

The concept of force protection continues to evolve. Although it is impossible to eliminate all risk, given the reduced level of violence usually associated with MOOTW, an effective force protection program could significantly reduce this risk. Force protection should be a broad, comprehensive program that incorporates traditional and non-traditional measures and that focuses on centralized planning and direction and decentralized execution. Intelligence support should be tailored to meet the specific requirements of force protection programs. Moreover, the concept of force protection as a synergistic program of mutually supporting security measures should be established in joint doctrine. To accomplish this five recommendations are proposed.

First, the scope of force protection should be expanded to recognize the increasing variety of threats that confront United States forces, particularly those threats associated with MOOTW. At the same time, a broader range of security measures, both traditional and non-traditional, should be presented as being an integral part of a commander's force protection program. As a first step, two changes to the existing Joint Pub 1-02 definition of "force protection" should be made to enhance its scope and clarity: 1) the sources of

potential threats should be identified as "any person, element, or group hostile to United States interests,"[20] or who might feel threatened enough to react violently at the presence of United States personnel (i.e., organized criminal elements); and 2) non-traditional measures such as "psychological operations, civil affairs, public affairs, crime prevention, and criminal investigations" should be identified as integral parts of the program.

Second, force protection doctrine should be presented as a comprehensive program rather than a conglomeration of separate security measures. The term "security" relates only to measures employed or the end state to be attained.[21] The existing Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations, although a useful reference, fails to present the various security measures discussed as a synergistic force protection program. Force protection programs require planning and direction at the operational level and should be presented as such. In addition, the doctrine should differentiate between war and MOOTW, since the characteristics attendant to each directly affect the nature of the force protection program employed.

Third, the element within a joint task force (JTF) staff responsible for force protection--usually the JRAC--should be supported by a joint force protection element (JFPE) that is task organized to handle the threats anticipated during that particular operation. This would allow for a more tailored approach in combatting the variety of

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[20]Department of the Army, Headquarters Department of the Army, Peace Operations, FM 100-23, ([Washington, D.C.]: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1994), I-11.

[21]Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations, GL-10.

low-end threats usually associated with MOOTW. The JFPE would coordinate all security measures in the operating area, thereby ensuring a synergistic application of traditional and non-traditional measures. Appendix D provides a suggested organizational chart.[22]

Fourth, force protection must be included in contingency planning by whatever element--standing JTF, ad hoc JTF, or working group--employed by a particular unified commander. At this stage of the planning process, force protection efforts should focus on HUMINT and CI support. As such, a J-2 representative from one, or both, these disciplines should be included in all contingency planning. More importantly, the J-2 at the unified command should develop a priority country list that can be disseminated to theater intelligence assets, particularly HUMINT and CI. Updated periodically, this list would allow theater assets to focus on current areas of interest well in advance of warning orders and official tasking. For HUMINT and CI, this is critical, since it could reduce the time required to implement effective support once a crisis breaks.[23]

Fifth, intelligence support, in general, and HUMINT and CI support in particular, must be timely, accurate, and better focused on force protection. Recent efforts by the United States Atlantic Command (USACOM), during Operation Uphold Democracy should serve as a future model in this area. The JTFs formed to conduct operations in Haiti were each supported by a National Intelligence Support Team (NIST). These teams,

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[22]See Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations, II-5.

[23]See Donald R. Faint, "Contingency Intelligence," Military Review LXXIV (July, 1994): 59-60. Although LTC Faint's article pertains to the tactical level, application could be expanded to the operational level.

consisting of representatives from the various intelligence organizations, together with the theater JIC support teams, were integrated into the JTF staffs. They significantly enhanced the flow of intelligence from the national to the operational level.[24]

In addition to improved connectivity, USACOM also tailored its intelligence support to force protection. HUMINT and CI, the two intelligence related support functions critical to force protection, have been fused into a single element within the JTF J-2. Designated as the Joint Operations Support Element (JOSE), all HUMINT and CI activities within the operating area are coordinated by this element. The element also serves as a fusion cell for HUMINT and CI flowing down from the national/theater level, up from the tactical level, and laterally from the country team. Appendix E provides an organizational chart depicting this concept.[25]

Just as a commander uses operational planning in war to help prepare the battle space, so too can it be employed to prepare the operating environment during MOOTW. By planning and implementing a dynamic force protection program at the operational level, a more secure environment can be achieved. Within such an environment the force has greater freedom of action and movement. Ultimately, it is this freedom of action that leads to the achievement of operational objectives. More importantly, operations are less likely to be measured strictly in terms of cost.

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[24]See Thomas R. Wilson, 56.

[25]This organizational concept is based upon an unpublished briefing slide obtained from the United States Atlantic Command. The NIST and JRAC blocks were added by this author.

The recommendations made in this paper for increased emphasis on force protection and its role in MOOTW could reduce the risk to United States forces engaged in such operations. Commanders, however, must also remember that force protection is not simply a program, but a mind set. Despite how an operation is designated, each individual soldier, sailor, marine and airman must be made aware that threats exist in all operations and educated regarding the threat associated with specific operations. Doing this will help individuals to remain focused and to perform their duties as they were trained. In the end, it is this mind set that will be the backbone of any force protection program.

APPENDIX A

Range of Military Operations

Military Operations		General US Goal	Examples
COMBAT	War	Fight & Win	Large-scale Combat Operations: Attack Defend Blockades
COMBAT	NONCOMBAT Operations Other Than War	Deter War & Resolve Conflict	Peace Enforcement NEO Strikes Raids Show of Force Counterterrorism Peacekeeping Counterinsurgency
		Promote Peace	Antiterrorism Disaster Relief Peacebuilding Nation Assistance Civil Support Counterdrug NEO

Appendix B
Principles of War,
C. 350 B.C. to A.D. 1968

Order of Priority

Theoretician	1	2	3	4	5	6
Sun Tzu [1,2] 4TH Cent. B.C.	Objective	Offensive	Surprise	Concentration	Mobility	Coordination
Vegetius [1] ca. 390 A.D.	Mobility	Security	S	Offensive		
Saxo [2] 1757	Mobility	Morale	Security	S		
Napoleon [2] 1822	Objective	Offensive	Mass	Movement	S	Security
Clausewitz [1,2] 1832	Objective	Offensive	Concentration	Economy of Force	Mobility	S
Jomini [1] 1836	Objective	Movement	Concentration	Offensive	Diversion	
P.L. Mac Dougall [2] 1858	Mass	Direction				
N.B. Forrest [2] 1864	Mass	Direction	Rapidity	Offensive		
Fuller [2] 1912	Objective	Mass	Offensive	Security	S	Movement
Stalin [4] 1918 (-1947)	Stability of the Rear	Morale	Quality and Quantity	Armament	Organizing Ability of Commanders	S

Principles of War
C. 350 B.C. to A.D. 1968
(continued)

Order of Priority

Theoretician	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Foch[1] 1918	Offensive	Economy of Force	Freedom of Action	Free Disposal of Forces	Security				
C.V.F. Townshend[2] 1920	Objective	Economy of Force	Mass	Offensive	Direction	Security			
U.S. War Dept., Training Regula-tions, No. 10-5[2] 1921	Objective	Offensive	Mass	Ecomony of Force	Movement	S	Security	Simplicity	Coopera-tion
Fuller[2] 1925	Direction	Offensive	S	Concen-tration	Distribu-tion	Security	Mobility	Endurance	Determin-ation
Liddell Hart[1] 1929	Objective	Movement	S						
U.S. Command and General Staff School[2] 1936	Offensive	Concentra-tion	Economy of Force	Mobility	S	Security	Coopera-tion		
Mao[1] 1938	Political Objective	Mobility	Offensive	Defensive	Concentra-tion	(S)			

Principles of War, C. 350 B.C. to A.D. 1968 (continued)

Order of Priority

Theoretician	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
U.S. Army [1] FM 100-5 1941, 1944	Objective	Simplicity	Unity of Command	Offensive	Concentra-tion of Superior Force	S	Security		
Cyril Falls [2] c.1945	Economy of Force	Protection	S	Aggressive Reconnais-sance	Maintenance of the Aim				
Liddell Hart [1] 1954(-1967)	Alterna-tive Objec-tives	Movement	S						
Giap [1,3] 1960	Objective	Mobility	S	Morale	Security	Coopera-tion			
Guevara [1] 1960	Objective	Mobility	S						
Montgomery [1] 1968	S	Concentra-tion of Effort	Coopera-tion of all Arms	Control	Simplicity	Speed of Action	The Initia-tive		
U.S. Army [1] FM 100-5 1962(-1968)	Objective	Offensive	Mass	Economy of Force	Maneuver	Unity of Command	Security	S	Simplicity

Sources:

1. Compiled by Barton Whaley from the author's own published works.
2. Willoughby (39), 25-44.
3. Tanham (67), 74-78.
4. Garthoff (53), 34.

Appendix C
Joint Rear Area C2 Network
for Security Operations



KEY:
ARFOR - ARMY FORCES
AFFOR - AIR FORCE FORCES
MARFOR - MARINE COPRS FORCES
NAVFOR - NAVY FORCES
JSOTF - JOINT SPECIAL
OPERATIONS TASK FORCE

OPTION A - Portrays ARFOR designated as JRAC
OPTION B - Portrays JRAC selected from JFC HQ
1. Candidates for JRAC
2. May be intermediate cornerstands
_____ COCOM/OPCON
===== Coordinating authority, unless coinciding with previous established command lines or otherwise directed by JPC

APPENDIX D

SAMPLE ORGANIZATION OF
JOINT FORCE PROTECTION ELEMENT (JFPE)



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APPENDIX E

ORGANIZATION FOR
HUMINT AND CI SUPPORT



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